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INTRODUCTION

The need nor control over international cartel activities was
made painfully clear by Congressional exposure of an international
uranium cartel which orchestrated the major portion of a sevenfold increase in the price of uranium between 1972 and 1976.' Yet
this cartel, including its American corporate members, have successfully escaped attempts at regulation because of a serious
loophole in United States law. The continued maintenance of
uranium prices at the high level they reached during the period
of the cartel's greatest control is evidence that the cartel, or its
remnant, still dampens competition.
Unfortunately, the uranium cartel is not an isolated phenomenon; the United States faces the prospect of increasing cartel activity. The potential for workable cartels presently exists in several
commodit es, and host-countries and multinationals have already
initiated or attempted cartel activities in minerals and agricultural
goods.' The recent success of the OPEC cartel was a significant
factor influencing the formation of the uranium cartel by easing
corporate and governmental inhibitions against cartel activities.
Given the increasing exploitative attitude among developed countries and what has been termed the "irrational solidarity" among
developing countries, 3 it is not unreasonable to expect more imitations of OPEC success wherever market conditions would allow a
group of producers to extract monopoly rents from consuming nations.' Such activity poses a threat to the nation's ability to regulate the economy and forces priorities in the national budget to be
determined in response to inflationary pressures in large part generated by political and economic activity which is presently immune from the sanctions of United States antitrust laws. Perhaps
an even greater threat is posed by the danger that a resurgence of
cartel activity in the mainstream of international commerce could
threaten a return to the exploitative mentality that triggered the
1. 1 & 2 Hearings on the InternationalUranium Cartel before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). [hereinafter cited as Cartel Hearings].
2. C. FRED BEROSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND
AMERICAN INTEREST, 138, 139, 140 et seq. [hereinafter cited as BERGSTEN]. See
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, RAW MATERIALS AND FOREIGN POLICY,

77-83, 87-96 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ECON. STUD. INST.]
3. See R. Hansen, The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How
Much Change?, 29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 927 (1975).
4. ECON. STUD. INST., supra note 2, at 88-96.
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world-wide depression of the interwar period., While the chances
of such a recurrence may at this time seem remote, its potential
consequences in a world suffering from overpopulation and scarcity
of resources must not be risked. Even without such a catastrophe,
the social cost of worldwide cartelization would heavily burden
efforts aimed at maximizing economic welfare and redressing inequities in this country and abroad.
United States antitrust jurisdiction and regulatory powers are
presently too limited in their extraterritorial application to deal
effectively with the international cartel problem. The Cartel Restriction Act,6 now pending in Congress, seeks to correct this problem by minimizing the adverse impact of international cartels on
domestic and international commerce, by limiting participation by
American firms in cartels and by applying pressure on such activity through trade channels. 7 The proposed legislation attempts to
reduce the threat of international cartels in two ways: (1) require
U.S. companies to report any solicitation of cartel activities; (2)
strengthen the application of present antitrust law by limiting the
compulsion, as a
act of state doctrine and its corollary, sovereign
8
statutes.
antitrust
the
of
violations
to
defense
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

General

Nearly thirty-five years ago, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull concerning the danger posed
by international cartels. After noting the political use of cartels by
the Nazis, the President concluded that antitrust law
goes hand in glove with the liberal principles of international trade
Unfortunately, a number of foreign countries .

....

.

. do not

possess such a tradition against cartels. On the contrary, cartels
have received encouragement from some of these governments. Cartel practices which restrict the free flow of goods in foreign commerce will have to be curbed.'
5.

For an excellent analysis of the trade policies which led to the worldwide

depression, see C.

KINDLEBERGER, THE WoRLD IN DEPRESSION

1929-1939 (1973).

6. H.R. 4661, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 125 CONG. REc. H5421 (daily ed.
June 28, 1979) (introduced and referred jointly to the Committees on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce and Judiciary). See Appendix I where Rep. Gore's bill is
reproduced in its entirety.
7. Id. § 2.
8.

Id.

9.

Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State Cordell
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During the interwar period the international trade system was
distorted by the operation of numerous international cartels which
fixed prices, set production quotas, and allocated markets, particularly in many commodities and manufactured goods markets.' 0
The trade barriers created by these cartels stimulated new interest
in placing such organizations under governmental control, and following World War H a number of unsuccessful attempts were made
to reach an international antitrust agreement.' Despite the possibility of another depression, these attempts failed.
It was also during this period that multinational corporations
emerged as an important force in the world economy. A subcommittee of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee
produced a report outlining several existing and potential threats
which these business organizations posed to the worldwide consuming public.'2 Even if one does not accept the proposition that
multinationals are currently involved in activities adverse to the
interests of the United States or the international economy, the
very size and nature of the multinational operations of these firms
carry with them a potential for abuse. A leading international
economist who specialized in industrial organization theory observed that:
[M]ultinational corporations reduce the ability of the government
to control the economy ....
[B]ecause of their size and international connections, [they] have a certain flexibility for escaping
regulations imposed in one country. The nature and effectiveness of
traditional policy instruments-monetary policy, fiscal policy, antitrust policy, taxation policy, wage and income policy-change when
important segments of the economy are foreign-owned . . . . [I]t
is now becoming obvious that even the United States has reached
Hull (September 6, 1944), reprinted in E. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 405
app. (1st reprint 1971).
10. See generally E. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 184-391 (1st reprint
1971) [hereinafter cited as HEXNER].
11. See Metzer, Cartels, Combines, Commodity Agreements and International Law, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 527 (1976); Joelson, The Proposed International
Code of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L

Bus. 837 (1976); Timburg, An InternationalAntitrust Convention:A Proposalto
Harmonize Conflicting National PrioritiesTowards the Multinational Corporation, J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157 (1973).
12. P. MUSGRAVE, DmECT INVESTMENT ABROAD AND THE MULTINATIONALS: EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1975) (prepared for the use
of the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.) [hereinafter cited as MUSGRAVE].

CARTEL RESTRICTION ACT

Spring 19791

the point where the international commitments of its corporations
reduce the room for flexibility in national economic policy formation."3
Perhaps the greatest danger of multinationals lies in their willingness and ability to influence and cooperate with foreign governments in their own economic self-interest to limit competition in
the international market place. Because many multinationals already hold oligopolistic positions in their home economies, 4 they
may wield significant political as well as economic power there.
Furthermore, their cooperation with foreign and domestic governments contributes to the formation of international cartels and
may result in virtual immunity to the pressures which lead to the
ultimate collapse of most private cartels.
B.

The International Uranium Cartel

The international uranium cartel is a classic case of cooperation
between national and multinational firms, and foreign governments to extort a transfer of resources from consuming to producing nations. As with most vertically integrated 5 multinational
firms engaged in mineral extraction, the uranium producers invested abroad in order to secure access to raw materials and thus
avoid the necessity of purchasing them at arms-length prices from
independent suppliers. 6
The uranium cartel was formed in response to the
"demoralized" price structure of the industry in the 60's and early
70's. The industry had acquired considerable excess capacity
which could be expected to stay idle or underutilized for some time
to come. 7 This excess capacity had led to falling prices such that
ultimately revenue from uranium production barely covered pro13. Hymer, The Efficiency (Contraditions)of MultinationalCorporations,60
AM. ECON. REV. 441 (1970).
14. MUSGRAVE, supra note 12, at 60, 61.

15. F. M. Scherer explains vertical integration as "the extreme to which firms
...cover the entire range of production and distribution stages." F. M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET

[hereinafter cited as

STRUCTURE
SCHERER].

AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 70

(1970).

For a description of the nature and effect of

vertical integration, see id. at 69-71.
16. For a discussion of the economics of raw material extraction industries see
BERGSTEN, supra note 2, at 121-64; MUSGRAVE, supra note 10, at 59-61.

17.

DUCHESNEAU,

COMPETITION IN THE

[hereinafter cited as DUCHESNEAU].

U.S.

ENERGY INDUSTRY

87, 88 (1975)
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duction costs.'" Aggravating the situation was the fact that anticipated increase in demand had been foreclosed by a slowdown in
construction of nuclear-powered electrical generators caused by
growing concerns about the potential dangers presented by nuclear
power. 9 Additionally, foreign producers had been especially burdened by the 1966 AEC decision to ban imports of uranium for
domestic use.2" In 1971 the uranium market was further destabilized by the possibility that the Australian government might start
production from its vast uranium reserves. 1
In 1971 uranium producers with foreign operations joined with
their host-country governments in discussions which led to the
establishment of a formal marketing organization. The organization, referred to by its members as "the club, 2 2 was intended to
allocate market shares, set floor prices, and police the cartel agreement through what amounted to a system of collusive tendering.
The club divided the "non-U.S." market among its member countries, who then divided that share among producers operating in
areas under its control.2? The club also established a schedule of
minimum prices below which no member was allowed to bid without express permission. 24 The bidding itself was tightly controlled
by the cartel's operating committee which would designate a leading bidder and runner-up bidder whose bids would differ from the
floor price by a margin of 20 to 30 cents per pound of processed
uranium. 25 Separate floor prices were established for the European
and Asian markets with the Asian market floor price set at thirty
cents higher than the European market.2 1 Within these markets,
18.

BERGSTEIN, supra note 2, at 180; J.

YAGER

& E. STEINBERG, ENERGY AND

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 346 (1974); 1 Cartel Hearings, supra note 1, at 648-49 app.
(confidential report to Irwin J. Landes, Chairman, Corporations, Authorities, and
Commissions Committee, from William F. Haddad, Office of Legislative Oversight and Analysis (May 20, 1977) (revised)).
19. T. DUCHESNEAU, supra note 17, at 87; 1 Cartel Hearings, supra note 3, at
648, 649; YAGER AND STEINBERG, supra note 18, at 346.
20. 2 Cartel Hearings, supra note 3, at 71-77.
21. 1 Cartel Hearings, supra note 3, at 651, 653.
22. The member countries of the club included Australia, Canada, France,
and South Africa. Great Britain and West Germany also had corporate nationals
involved in the cartel.
23. 1 Cartel Hearings,supra note 3, at 628, 629 app. (Rules for Orderly Marketing).
24. Id. at 631, 639 app.
25. Id. at 628, 635-40 app.
26. Id. at 667-69 app.
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all bids had to be routed through the committee,2 with any attempt at price shaving or other "cheating" 28punishable by a reduction in the whole country's market share.

Traditional theories of cartel operation hold that under normal
circumstances producer cartels are susceptible to internal pressures which lead to their demise in the long run:
Though over the short run its (the cartel) members may gain by
limiting production and dividing the market, any one member can
gain more-can expand its market share-by discounting the cartel
price (provided it doesn't, by this action, cause the breakup of the
cartel). Once a member starts to cheat, moreover, any member that
does not will lose out.29
Once cheating has begun, the cartel will break up unless there is
an adequate enforcement mechanism. Even in the absence of
cheating, over the long run, the cartel's monopoly pricing should,
under normal market conditions, induce new firms to enter the
market. Unless the cartel can successfully freeze out new competitors, or consistently under-bid them, the cartel will lose revenues,
increasing the pressures for its members to adopt an "every man
for himself" attitude.
The economic and political realities of the uranium market,
however, helped to insulate the cartel from these internal pressures. Inelasticity of demand facilitated price discipline, and economies of scale and absolute cost requirements made it risky for new
firms to enter, particularly in view of the past weakness of the
market. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the availability of
government sanctions for cheaters gave the enforcement mechanism real clout." The governments involved were sufficiently sophisticated to understand that their long-term advantage lay in
maintaining high price levels.
Although the rules of the club specifically excluded the United
States market from this pricing agreement, some members of the
cartel had direct links to United States producers, which provided
the mechanism for a system of price leading. An internal Gulf Oil
memorandum stated:
27. Id. at 635 app.
28. Wall St. J., June 23, 1977, at col. 2.
29. BERGSTEN, supra note 2, at 140.
30. Uranium cartel producers alleged that the Canadian government had
vowed to deny any application for an export license where the price did not follow
the "club's" schedule. 2 Cartel Hearings, supra note 3, at 12 et seq. (Gulf legal

dept. opinion memorandum).
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The international producers are in effect setting the world price via
(a) establishing a floor that is higher than the U.S. offers to buy, (b)
the U.S. producers refuse to sell at any price that doesn't give them
a substantial margin above the floor being quoted by the non-U.S.
producers, (c) thus in essence the international producers can stop
any transaction by constantly nudging the floor upward. In the interim the U.S. buyer becomes increasingly frustrated, offers a higher
3
price in order to get some response, and the cycle starts over again. '
A survey of electric utilities in the United States by the Oversight
and Investigation Subcommittee found that members of the foreign cartel signed contracts with United States utilities that paralleled the prices set secretly by the cartel.2 Rather than compete,
American producers merely raised their prices to meet or exceed
33
world price.

III.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS

IN DEALING WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CARTELS

A.

The General Regime

The basic purpose of United States antitrust law is to encourage
the efficient allocation of productive resources within the market
economy. In other words, these laws attempt to maximize the
economic welfare of the populace by requiring, insofar as possible,
business behavior to conform to a model of perfect competition
31. Memorandum from W. D. Fowler to L. J. Colby, Jr. (Mar. 28, 1974),
reprinted in 1 Cartel Hearings, supra note 1, at 627 app. [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum].
32. 1 Cartel Hearings, supra note 1, at 342-44 (testimony of P. McLain).
33. The uranium cartel is not an isolated example of attempts by a cartel to
restrain international trade. Its discovery closely followed the first assertions of
economic power by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
At that time some analysts maintained that "oil was the exception" because the
conditions which facilitated OPEC's survival as a functioning unit were unique.
See Krasner, Oil is the Exception, 1974 FOREIGN PoLicY 68 et seq.; Varon &
Takenchi, Developing Countries and Non-FuelMinerals, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 497-510
(1974). Therefore, it was felt that the possibility that OPEC's success might be
imitated in another commodity was unlikely. According to these analysts, OPEC
maintained the cartel price without internal price wars by a combination of
inelastic demand and the ability of the Saudis to vary production to demand.
Bergsten, supra note 2, at 140, 141. Moreover, OPEC's core of Arab states gave it
greater unity because of common religious and political beliefs. Id. The uranium
cartel experience tends to place this argument in serious doubt.
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tempered by other societal goals and aspirations. Antitrust law
seeks to achieve this goal by influencing business conduct and
market structure in such a way as to "increase the likelihood that
desirable conduct and performance will emerge more or less automatically."3
United States antitrust laws have succeeded in eliminating or
severely weakening most domestic cartel activity. 5 By applying its
antitrust policy to all firms engaged in private anticompetitive
activity which may affect or is intended to affect United States
commerce, the United States has nominally attempted to protect
its economy from the effects of foreign anticompetitive activity.
Foreign sovereigns and their agents, however, have been largely
immune from antitrust prosecution in United States courts as a
result of judicially created doctrines of restraint which include the
act of state doctrine and its corollary, the doctrine of sovereign
compulsion.
B.

The ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Antitrust Law

1. Violations of the Antitrust Acts Abroad
The first case to consider the extraterritorial effect of United
States antitrust law was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.36 United Fruit was accused of having influenced the Costa
Rican government to expropriate the holdings of American Banana
by force. The Court applied the restrictive territorial principle of
jurisdiction, ruling that the Sherman Act afforded the Court no
jurisdiction over acts which take place outside of the United
States. The Court stated "the character of an act as unlawful must
be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
37
done."
American Bananahas never been expressly overruled, but developments have led the Second Circuit to conclude that it is no
longer controlling on the jurisdictional issue.3 American Banana
may have been correctly decided, however, even by today's standards, because the complaint failed to allege any effects on United
34.

SCHERER,

35.

POSNER, supra note

supra note 15, at 422.
33, at 39, 40.
36. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
37. Id. at 356.
38. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977).
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States commerce. 9 Moreover, American Banana involved an act
of state by a foreign sovereign-an aspect that will be explored
shortly. 0
In United States v. American Tobacco4 the Supreme Court
ruled that a lower court had erred in dismissing an antitrust action
brought against two British firms that had agreed with an American combination to allocate the British and American tabacco
markets, as well as the export markets of both.12 The Government
argued that an agreement in violation of the laws of the United
States, although made in a foreign country, "gives no immunity
to parties acting here in pursuance of it.""4 While the Court did not
fully justify its decision,, it found by implication that "division of
the world's business by the two foreign contracts" was within the
jurisdiction of the United States because the contracts affected
commerce.

44

In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.4" the Supreme Court found
a violation of the Sherman and Wilson Tariff Acts where several
American corporations and a Mexican corporation had conspired
together to monopolize the importation of sisal. The Court held
that the doctrine presented in American Banana was not controlling because the conspiracy was entered into and made effective
by acts committed within the United States." The Court suggested
that acts outside the U.S. which bring about "forbidden results"
within it would be actionable.

7

The jurisdictional basis for extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws was firmly established in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America.4" The Government had charged a subsidiary of Alcoa with participation in an international aluminum
cartel known as the Alliance. 9 Alliance, a Swiss corporation made
up of several foreign corporations, functioned as a marketing committee for the cartel. Members were initially allocated production
39. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as FUGATE].

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See text accompanying notes 157-74 infra.
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 180.
274 U.S. 268 (1927).
Id. at 276.
Id.
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 439-45.
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quotas on the basis of shares held with any unused portion of the
quota to be bought by.Alliance at a fixed price. 0 The cartel later
discarded that method and adopted a royalty system under which
each producer paid Alliance for production in excess of its quota.
Ultimately, these royalties were divided among the members of the
cartel. Although the quota production scheme of the cartel included American imports, the trial court found that such an agreement could not be held to be a violation of United States law. A
special bench of the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a foreign
corporation could be held liable for acts in violation of United
States antitrust law even when those acts were committed abroad
so long as the acts "were intended to affect and did affect" United
States commerce.51 The Court distinguished this rule from cases
involving restrictive agreements concerning only foreign markets
which have indirect repercussions on United States trade. In other
words, the antitrust law did not apply in cases where there was no
intent to restrain United States trade even though there was some
indirect effect on domestic commerce. However, the Court did not
deny that the Act would apply in cases where there was intent but
no effect. The test requiring both intent and effect is flexible, and
where intent is provided, there is a strong presumption of effect:
[A]fter the intent to affect imports was proved, the burden of proof
shifted to "Limited" . . . . [A] depressant upon production which
applies generally may be assumed, ceteris paribus, to distribute its
effect evenly upon all markets. Again, when the parties took the
trouble specifically to make the depressant apply to a given market,
there is reason to suppose that they expected that it would have
some effect, which it could have only been lessening what would
otherwise have been imported. 5
Since Alcoa, the courts and the Justice Department have used
this "direct and substantial effect" test within the framework articulated by the Second Circuit. 53 While nationality and locale
may provide grounds for asserting jurisdiction, the primary test for
applying United States antitrust laws extraterritorially is the existence of effects actually occurring within the United States. 4
50. Id. at 442, 443.
51. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 444.
53. FUGATE, supra note 117, at 73, 74;
ANTITRUST DIVISION,

UNrrE

STATES DEPARTZMENT OF JUSTICE,

ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

6 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as GUIDE].

54. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit substantially reiterated the "effects" test in 1976 in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America.15 The Timberlane court applied a three-part analysis:
First, there must be "some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce." Second, in civil cases there must be a
showing of cognizable injury to the plaintiff. Third, the interests
of other nations must be considered.56
The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations adopts the view that foreign transactions which
have a "substantial and forseeable effect" on United States commerce are subject to United States law. 57 While some courts may
have difficulty applying this standard, it is the currently accepted
statement of the scope of extraterritorial application of domestic
antitrust law."8 Through this policy, the Justice Department seeks
to achieve two goals: (a) the protection of the domestic consumer
from the effects of restricted competition especially in markets
heavily dominated by imports, and (b) protection of United States
export and investment opportunities against privately imposed
restrictions. 9 The Justice Department specifically disavows any
intent to apply the antitrust laws to activities which do not directly
affect United States consumers or exporters in order to avoid impinging on the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.60
The Antitrust Guide for International Operations outlines two
basic types of jurisdictional defenses that may be involved in cases
involving government-sponsored cartel activity: the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine with its corollary,
the doctrine of sovereign compulsion. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity precludes exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant when
that defendant is a sovereign state."' The problem raised by the
Cir. 1976). See E.

KINTER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 27

(1974).
55. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 613.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6, 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4, 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. See also The Exercise of State Jurisdiction Under National and Inter-

national Law (Nov. 13, 1978) at 19 (Congressional Research Service monograph
prepared by Kenneth Merin, American Law Division, Library of Congress.)
[hereinafter cited as Cong. Research Monograph]. See generally 6 WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-726 (1968).
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doctrine were the subject of the Sovereign Immunities Act 62 which
was signed into law in 1976. A discussion of the doctrine and its
application is beyond the scope of this paper.
2. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a choice-of-laws principle under
which United States courts refrain from inquiring into the validity
of the acts of a foreign government within its own territory.63 The
United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez4 described the doctrine as follows:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of government of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obopen to be availed of by sovereign powers
tained through the means
65
as between themselves.

The Court's holding in Underhill was reaffirmed in Banco Na6 In Sabbatino the court refused to
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1
review the validity of an expropriation of a cargo of sugar by the
Cuban government even though the expropriation was alleged to
have violated international law.6
The courts have created two exceptions to the act of state doctrine. Under the Bernstein exception, courts may review the acts
of a sovereign when the State Department determines that United
6
States foreign policy would not be damaged by such recognition. 1
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1976).
63. Cong. Research Monograph, supra note 153. at 29. Cf. Joelson & Griffin,
The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under StatesAntitrust Law and Public
International Law, 9 INT'L LAWYER 631 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Joelson &
Griffin]. Joelson and Griffin view the Act of State doctrine as an "exception" to
conflict principles.
64. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
65. Id. at 252.

66. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
67. Id. at 428.
68. Bernstein was a former German citizen who sought to recover property
taken by the Nazi's under the antisemitic confiscation law. His claim was initially
rejected on the basis of the act of state doctrine. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres
Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
Bernstein had brought a concurrent suit on essentially the same claim against
other defendants. That portion of his claim which related to acts of Nazi officials
was again denied. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaanche StoomvaartMaatschappij, 76 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), affl'd, 173 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir.
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More recently the Supreme Court apparently recognized a
"commercial exception" in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 9 In Dunhill the government of Cuba was attempting to recover some monies from Dunhill that were due from Dunhill to a nationalized firm prior to the fall of the Batista regime. T0
Dunhill counterclaimed to recover monies that were "wrongfully"
paid after the fall and which agents of the new government refused
to repay." Four of the members of the Court agreed that the doctrine should not be extended "to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial operations."1 2 The
Court observed that there was a greater potential for embarrassment if the courts were to recognize repudiation of a commercial
debt by a foreign government as an act of state:
, , . subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their
commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their
sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of their
governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they
exercise only those powers that can also be exercised by private
citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same
citizens is unlikely to touch very
rules of law that apply to private
7' 3
sharply on "national nerves.
The opinion of the Court analogized the act of state doctrine to the
1949). The State Department then wrote a letter to the court stating that it was
the policy of the Executive "to relieve American courts from any restraint upon
the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity" of the Nazi confiscatory acts. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dept. of State to the
Attorneys for [Bernstein] (April 27, 1949), cited in Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d
Cir. 1954). Upon receipt of the letter, the court modified its previous ruling and
allowed the district court to decide the case upon all the merits. Id. at 376. The
Supreme Court refrained from passing on the "Bernstein" exception until First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Three of
the five member majority approved of the "Bernstein" exception. Id. at 768.
While concurring in the result, Justice Douglas felt that the Bernstein exception
was not at issue. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J. concurring). Powell also withheld his
approval of the Bernstein exception. Id. at 773 (Powell, J. concurring). The four
dissenters were firmly against the exception. Id. at 785-93 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
69. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
70. Id. at 691-95.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 706.
73. Id. at 703-05 (footnotes omitted).
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theory of sovereign immunity and determined that the act of state
doctrine was limited by a commercial activities exception. Justice
Marshall's dissent, which was joined by three other justices, rejected the similarity of act of state and sovereign immunity stress74
ing that such a broad exception would be difficult to apply.
A simple connection between the exceptions noted above and
the use of the act of state doctrine as a defense in antitrust cases
by foreign firms engaged in cartel activities affecting the United
States does not exist. The doctrine is technically a defense that is
only open to sovereign states, but private parties may ask a court
to take cognizance of an act of state.7 1 In American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. 76 United Fruit claimed that even if charges that
it had influenced the Costa Rican government to expropriate
American Banana's holdings there were true, it could not be held
liable for the expropriation, because the expropriation was an act
of a foreign sovereign government. 77 Relying upon Underhill the
Court agreed on the grounds that a foreign sovereign's conduct was
not subject to judicial review under the antitrust law, even where
it was influenced by and beneficial to a U.S. citizen.78 The Court
found any consideration of the influence of the defendants inappropriate because the acts were lawful within the foreign sovereign's territory and an examination of the motivation of the Costa
Rican government would have been equivalent 7 to sitting in judgment on the validity of that government's act. 1
In United States. v. Sisal Sales Corp.,'" the defendants were
charged with conspiring to monopolize the sisal market. It was
alleged the defendants had procured from the Mexican government discriminatory legislation which eliminated the company's
competition."' The Court managed to sidestep the act of state
question by finding that the defendants could not rely upon the
legislative acts of a foreign state to give them immunity because
there were violations of United States law within United States
74. Id. at 725-26 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
75. Cong. Research Monograph, supra note 153, at 29; Sovereign Compulsion
Defense in Antitrust Litigation: New Life for the Act of State Doctrine?, PRoc.
AM. Soc. INT'L L. aa (1978) (remarks of E. Fox) [hereinafter cited as PRoc. INT'L
L.].
76. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
77. Id. at 352 (argument for defendant in error).
78. Id. at 358. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
79. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. at 351-58.
80. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
81. Id. at 273.
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territory which gave effect to the entire conspiracy.82
In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co.,83 the
court held that an inquiry into the motivation behind a foreign
government's action would have the very consequences on foreign
relations that the act of state doctrine was intended to avoid.,4 The
court observed:
[PIlaintiffs have in another phase of this motion dubbed the states
involved . . . as co-conspirators. The implication to be drawn from
this allegation is that plaintiffs do question the conduct of these
states under the antitrust laws-an inquiry which the act of state
doctrine bars.1
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,"6 the act of state defense was raised
in what appeared to be a cartel-like conspiracy by the "Seven
Sisters" group of oil companies which had sought to keep Persian
Gulf crude oil prices competitive with those of Libyan producers.87
Hunt alleged that an agreement entered into by the area producers
had the effect of manipulating Hunt's negotiations with Libya
with the net result being that Hunt's oil interests in Libya were
expropriated." The Court of Appeals held that Hunt's failure to
cite Libya as a co-conspirator did not remove the necessity of examining the Sovereign's actions. The court reasoned that Hunt
would first have to show that Libya would not have acted but for
the conspiracy. 9 Hunt's ultimate success was contingent upon his
showing that there was a direct injury from the defendant's actions.
Multinational corporations may be able to use the Hunt court's
prohibition of the examination of a foreign State's motives to immunize their activities from suit even in cases involving monopolization and cartel conspiracies instituted by private parties conspiring with a foreign government. When the "offending" action is
committed by a government, under the Hunt rational the courts
may not inquire into the role played by the private party defen82.
83.
Cir.),
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 276.
331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
Id. at 102, 110.
Id. at 110.
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 70-72.
Id. at 71, 72.
Id. at 72, 76.
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dants in facilitating the anticompetitive result.9" This conclusion
is reinforced by Justice Department guidelines which provide that
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine9 corporations are free to
advocate anticompetitive acts to foreign governments. "The
collection exercise of the right of political expression is protected,
even where its goal is highly anticompetitive." 9 2 Exceptions are
made only in cases of "sham," collective lying, and bribery. 13 The
reasoning in American Banana, Hunt and Occidentaltends to sustain the application of this doctrine in foreign antitrust cases."
The threat of government-sponsored cartels protected by the act
of state doctrine is obvious and growing. To enjoy the benefits of
cartel activity, multinational firms need only quietly accept the
foreign governments' directions.9 5 For example, OPEC price increases are effected through a mandatory increase in posted
prices." A similar scheme appears to be underway in the International Bauxite Association in which the member governments have
or plan to implement a mandatory increase in prices and taxes.9"
The companies involved are expected to cooperate unhesitatingly.98 As long as restrictive action is effectuated in response to a
direct act of a foreign government, the act of state doctrine would
apparently require dismissal of the action.99 Consequently, when
90. See, FUGATE, supra note 39, at 82, 84. K.
CAN

BREWSTER,ANTITRUST AND AMERI-

BUSINESS ABROAD 95 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BREWSTER].

91. As originally developed by the Court, the doctrine provides: essentially
that in domestic cases, the Sherman Act cannot be applied to bar collective
political activity. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
92. GUIDE, supra note 137, at 63.
93. Id. See also California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
94. See, e.g., Bokkelan v. Grumman Aircraft Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329
(E.D.N.Y., 1977) (act of state doctrine barred inquiry into role of firm in causing
denial of import license). See BREWSTER, supra note 207, at 95, 96. See also
Schwartz, The Anti-Foreign Compulsion Act, 12 INT'L LAW. 649, 653, 654 (1978).
It seems a rather simple proposition that if multinational firms have a right to
"advise" host-country governments, and if the courts cannot question either the
"validity" or motivation of the acts of foreign governments, multinational firms
can easily cooperate with those host-country governments to form cartels where
the enforcement sanctions are meted out by the governments and the multinations are immune from antitrust liability.
95. See BERGSTEN, supra note 2, at 213.
96. See Joelson & Griffin, supra note 63, at 620-22.
97. ECON. STUD. INST., supra note 2, at 89.
98. BERGSTEN, supra note 2, at 155.
99. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir., 1977) (court
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the restraints on trade are effected by an act of state, the private
parties involved in the controversy have not been held liable for
their anticompetitive acts.
Griffin and Joelson have suggested that the act of state defense
may be available to government agencies which would otherwise
be amenable to suit in United States courts under a theory of
restrictive sovereign immunity so long as they are acting on behalf
of their government.100 While acts of states outside their territory
will not be recognized for purposes of the act of state doctrine by
United States courts, the validity of domestic acts with extraterritorial effects is immune from judicial review.' 0' Under this analysis, the increase in posted prices by OPEC would fall into the act
of state category because it involved regulation of commerce within
the oil producing Arab nations which had an extraterritorial ef02
fect.
Such an analysis would immunize almost all government sponsored and directed cartels from antitrust action so long as the
government in question was sufficiently sophisticated to follow the
OPEC model. As with OPEC, the multinationals can be depended
upon to cooperate with the foreign government in order to capitalize on the opportunity to collect oligopoly profits. In effect this
relationship establishes a pattern for division of labor between the
foreign government and the cartel: multinationals contribute their
market power and expertise in production and marketing, while
the participating governments issue commercial regulations which
effectively limit production, set prices and allocate markets. In
this hypothetical but very possible worst case interpretation of the
act of state doctrine, foreign governments and multinational corporations are provided with the incentive and opportunity to join
together to arrange and operate effective production cartels which
will be protected from United States antitrust action so long as
certain requisite elements appear in the cartel organization. (I.e.
the acts which restrain trade must be carried out by authorized
government entities in the pursuit of a clearly announced public
policy, and must take place within the territory of the participating states.) While the legality of such cartels has yet to be tried in
held that lower court properly granted a motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(2)
to dismiss a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because act of state doctrine rendered claim nonjusticiable).
100. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 63, at 631.
101. Id. at 631, 632.
102. Id. at 635.
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a proper case, it is reasonable to assume that these kinds of cartels
will be found to be immune from prosecution under current law.
3.

Sovereign Compulsion

The defense of sovereign compulsion is distinguished from the
act of state doctrine in that it applies to private parties compelled
by the government of a foreign state to commit an act that would
otherwise violate U.S. law."0 3 As one commentator has stated, an
act of state defense says "the government did it, you can't come
after me" whereas a defense of sovereign compulsion says "I did
it, but I'm not guilty because the government made me do it.""4
Apparently, Gulf Oil's decision to join the uranium cartel relied at
least in part on the proposition that it could not be held liable for
its otherwise unlawful acts because the acts were required by the
Canadian government and would therefore fall within the sovereign compulsion defense.0 5
In InteramericanRefining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,' 6
the district court dismissed an antitrust action where the government of Venezuela had ordered the defendants to refrain from
selling oil to the plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs alleged that compliance
with the order constituted participation in a secondary boycott.
The government order itself was based in part on political
0 8 and the desire to prevent oil from entering "unnatural
grounds"
markets" which would have had a depressing effect on prices of
duty-free sales.0 9 To enforce its decision, the government threatened to suspend defendants' concessions." 0 Although the court
found no clear precedent, it accepted the defense of sovereign compulsion:
103. Note, Development of the Doctrine of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 888, 897 (1971); see generally PROC. INT'L L., supra note 189, at 99, 100.
104. PRoc. INT'L L., supra note 189, at 99 (remarks of M. Cooper, moderator).
105. Gulf Oil Legal Dep't. Opinion Memorandum (Sept. 8, 1972) 47-57, 8487, reprinted in 2 Cartel Hearings, supra note 1, at 237-47 app., 247-77 app.
106. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970).
107. Id. at 1296.
108. The owners of Interamericanwere former Venezuelan nationals who were
one-time political rivals of the regime then in power. Id. at 1294-96.
109. The oil in question would have been shipped to a bonded refinery in New
York and then the refined products sold on foreign markets. Since the reshipped
oil products would not have been subject to a duty, they could have been sold at
a lower price thereby causing instability in the cartel price for refined products.
Id. at 1294, 1295.
110. Id. at 1294.
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[S]overeignty includes the right to regulate commerce within the
nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have
no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the
sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United
States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns."'

The court agreed with the position that refusal to deal in this
context would not constitute a restraint on trade, because trade
was conditioned on acceptance of the laws of the foreign government.211

While most commentators agree that sovereign compulsion is
not a good defense for acts committed wholly within the United
States, the status of foreign transactions not wholly within the
territory of the commanding sovereign is less clear." 3 For example,
the recent consent decree in the Bechtel case in effect allows the
defendant to discriminate against businesses listed on the Arab
blacklist so long as he solicits bids from foreign firms outside the
United States."'
111. Id. at 1298.
112. Id. See BREWSTER, supra note 90, at 94. The court found an analogy to
the sovereign compulsion doctrine in the state action defense articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker the Supreme Court held valid a
California prorationing system which decreased competition and increased prices,
and controlled about 95 percent of the raisin industry. Id. at 359. The Court found
that the system did not violate the Sherman Act because the system was established by the "legislative command" of the State acting in its capacity as sovereign. The Court emphasized that the Sherman Act was concerned with individual
action rather than state action. The Court observed that, "the prorate program
here was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the
state and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command." Id. at 350. Although the producers had solicited and approved the prorationing program, it was adopted and implemented by the State. Id. at 351-52.
The InteramericanRefining court equated compulsion by a foreign sovereign
with compulsion by a state; the act of refusing to sell would have been a violation
of the Sherman Act but for the command of the foreign sovereign. 370 F. Supp.
at 1298. The Court in Parker, however, was careful to declare that a state could
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act; it was the state's action
in prescribing and applying the regulation that was exempt from the Sherman
Act. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
113. See GUIDE, supra note 53, at 52. See also Note, Development of the
Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REV. 888, 900 (1971); Graziano,
Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law,
7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100 (1967).
114.

See generally Proposed Final Judgment, 796 ANTITRUST &

TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) E-1 (Jan. 10, 1977). For an excellent analysis of the sovereign compul-
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One may conclude, therefore, that cartel participation is protected from antitrust liability under the act of state and sovereign
compulsion doctrines whenever the cartel activities of the participants are carried out under the control of a member government.
For example, suppose Company X manufacturers widgets in country B, a member of the international widget cartel. B may order
X to control the prices and quantity of widgets produced in B. If
all or most of X's widget production is located within other member countries, the cartel can control the widget market directly.
However, if X and other widget producers have significant production in the United States, the economic factors within the widget
industry that led X and other companies to invest abroad will
probably give the member countries of the cartels sufficient leverage to effectively control prices and production without acting outside their own jurisdiction. If the widget industry is highly concentrated in the United States, an intergovernmental cartel adopting
a system of posted floor prices and production quotas within the
member countries would provide guidelines for a widget oligopolist
to follow without resorting to overt collusion."1 5 This was essentially
the effect the uranium cartel had on the domestic United States
industry.
OPEC has remained a viable cartel without regulating activities
sion issues posed by this case, see Note, United States v. Bechtel Corp., Antitrust
and the Arab Blacklist, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 313-17 (1978).
115. The main problem with such a system is policing the agreement. The
cartel would be vulnerable to cheating or to new entrants. The cartel price serves
as a guide for the pricing policies of firms with plants or production located in
non-cartel countries. Likewise, the production quotas set for operations in cartel
countries would have to take outside production into account. Firms that attempt
to cheat by increasing their production or undercutting prices outside of the cartel
countries can still be penalized via their holdings inside the cartel countries.
However, even firms outside the cartel countries may find it profitable to abide
by the cartel prices, so long as they are reasonably confident that other firms are
also abiding by them.
An analogous example was the domestic oil cartel that was operating in the
United States up until the rise of OPEC. Under the Interstate Oil Compact, state
commissions set production quotas for each oil well. The Bureau of Mines published monthly demand estimates at given prices. Although the oil companies
could not overtly collude in order to set prices, sufficient information was exchanged via the government agencies that the industry was able to follow fairly
uniform pricing policies. See Adams, CorporatePower and Economic Apologetics:

A Public Policy Perspective, in

INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING

370, 371 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974). Cf. M ADELMAN,
WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET

THE

(1972) (Adelman states that major purpose of the

cartel was to keep small producers in the market).
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of oil companies in non-OPEC countries because of the high inelasticity of demand and higher production costs in non-OPEC nations. In a manufacturing industry with typical oligopoly characteristics, the host may be able to implement a cartel without having to resort to controls on United States production. Price leadership in the world market can induce producers in a non-cartel
jurisdiction to tacitly abide by the rules.
The InteramericanRefining decision raises the question whether
a court can consider the validity of the foreign sovereign's command under any circumstances." 6 The Justice Department's
Guide does require a valid government decree.11 7 However, the
InteramericanRefining court, basing its decision on the act of state
doctrine, refused to consider the plaintiff's contention that the
Venezuelan boycott order was invalid under Venezuelan law."'
The Hunt decision also indicates that courts may not inquire into
the motivation or appropriateness of a "decree.""' Apparently, the
Guide's requirement of a valid decree is a formal requirement without substance; United States courts accept the act of a foreign
state without question.'
This position grants firms a type of vicarious immunity for cartel
activities carried out pursuant to an order of a foreign government. 2 ' Placing what amounts to an absolute bar on prosecution
aggravates the risk that the multinational firm will actively seek
such cartel arrangement and inspires tacit collusion, if not outright
cooperation, between businesses and host governments. This cooperation makes the gQvernment-sponsored cartel particularly dangerous and requires that greater control be placed on the participation of multinational firms in government-sponsored cartels.
4.

Foreign Law Analogs to the Act of State
and Foreign Compulsion Doctrines

Although the doctrines of act of state and sovereign compulsion
have been justified on grounds of international comity, other modern industrial states have taken a less charitable view of these
theories, at least when the acts done or required by foreign govern116. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1299 (D. Del. 1970).
117. GUIDE, supra note 53, at 54.
118. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
119. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 68 (2d Cir., 1977).
120. See PRoc. INT'L L., supra note 75, at 102, 103 (remarks of M. Joelson).
121. See Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1975] Q.B. 557, 579-80.
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ments are contrary to the public policy of the home country.' 2 In
Great Britain, the doctrine does not extend to all acts by a foreign
sovereign, even where it involves acts committed which affect only
persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of the sover"24 a
eign.'2 In a case arising out of the same events as Occidental,'
British court, taking exception to the Supreme Court decision in
the Underhill case, refused to strike the pleadings on the basis of
the act of state doctrine.' u Noting that courts in the United Kingdom had never interpreted the doctrine so broadly'2 the court held
that such a broad interpretation would grant immunity to acts by
a foreign sovereign urged by businesses.'27 Under British law, the
government may order a British corporation that is a member of a
2
foreign cartel to resign.'
Other common law jurisdictions also narrowly interpret the act
of state doctrine. An Australian writer has commented that the
decision in Buttes v. Hammer stands for the general proposition
that the doctrine should be restricted to a narrow class of acts. The
exempt acts must relate to belligerency, quasi-belligerency, or
treaty obligations,'29 and parties not entitled to sovereign immunity should not be allowed to "shelter behind the acts or approval
of a sovereign."' 30 In Canada the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission has the authority to restrain a Canadian firm from implementing a foreign law or decree if that law or decree would adversely affect competition, decrease the efficiency of Canadian industry, or otherwise restrain or injure Canadian commerce.13 '
Most European countries do not have a doctrine analogous to the
32
act of state doctrine; they rely on their own conflict of laws rules.'
These principles prohibit recognition of a foreign governmental act
122. See generally Antitrust Laws and the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign
Countries (Oct. 3, 1978) (report prepared by the staff of the Law Library, Library
of Congress for use of Rep. Gore) [hereinafter cited as LOC Report].
123. LOC Report, supra 122 ("Great Britian").
124. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer [1975] Q.B. 557.
125. Id. at 574, 575.
126. Id. at 573.
127. Id. at 579-80.
128. LOC Report, supra note 122 ("Great Britain"). See also V. KORAH, COMPETITION LAW OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET 31 (1975).
129. P. NYGH, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 68 (1976).

130. Id.
131. An Act to Amend the Combines Investigation Act, 1974-75-76 Can. Stat.
c. 76, §§ 31.5, 31.6. See also LOC Report, supra note 122 ("Canada").
132. See generally LOC Report, supra note 122.
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when the act runs counter to public policy or morals. 133 For example West Germany generally recognizes judgments of foreign courts
or the legal effect of foreign governmental acts in matters involving
private law, however the German courts may refuse to recognize
those which are primarily intended to protect economic interests
of a public law nature." 4 Moreover, the public policy exclusion is
generally applicable. Under Italian law, the government will not
enforce a foreign law or decree which runs counter to the Italian
public policy and morals.' This public order principle "protects
the country of the court from being forced to tolerate or to execute
as valid, legal relationships which in themselves are a violation of
the legal and moral concepts of the people. 136
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION

H.R. 4661,

THE CARTEL RESTRICTION

ACT OF 1979

The Cartel Restriction Act of 1979, as recently introduced in the
Ninety-sixth Congress, offers a balanced approach toward redressing the distortion of international and national economies resulting
from the excessive economic power of today's multinational corporations joined with the power of sovereign states in cartels.'37 Those
who find it presumptuous for the United States to force its own
ideas about competition on the rest of the world should remember
that the United States should and does have a leadership role in
economic as well as political affairs. In encouraging competition,
the United States is not simply asserting its own views of how the
world's resources should be allocated but is promoting an economic
system that will efficiently allocate increasingly scarce resources
among a growing and hungry world. House Resolution 13922,'3 the
predecessor to the current legislation, contained two sections not
included in the Cartel Restriction Act. Section 2 would have called
on the President to convene a conference of the GATT signatories,
or other appropriate fora, in order to negotiate an international
agreement aimed at limiting restrictive business practices. Upon
assurance that ongoing negotiations toward a restrictive business
133. Id.
134. LOC Report, supra note 122 ("Federal Republic of Germany").
135. THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 4 (M. Beltramo trans. 1969), cited in LOC Report, supra note 122 ("Italy").
136. F. CASTBERG, STUDIER I FOLKERETT 247-48 (1952).
137. H.R. 4661, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
138. H.R. 13922, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978). See Appendix I where H.R.
13922 is reproduced in its entirety.
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practices agreement are proceeding at an acceptable pace, 3 and
upon further assurance that the Executive Branch already had
sufficient authorization to impose sanctions on countries that attempt to cartelize international trade,' the legislation introduced
in the Ninety-sixth Congress focused on two major proposals. The
first section of the bill would amend the Federal Trade Commission Act so as to require firms to report participation or solicitation
of participation in anticompetitive activities abroad. With this
monitoring tool, the Government will be able to increase its control
over what would otherwise be covertly arranged cartel activity.
The second section provides for a clearer and narrower application
of the act of state doctrine. This section is intended to clarify an
area of the law in which court rulings have been vague and inconsistent with the declared antitrust policy of the United States. The
major provisions of the legislation are discussed below.
A.

Section 2-Reporting Requirements

Gulf's internal discussions about the uranium cartel indicate
that Gulf would not have participated in the cartel had they been
required to report their activities to the United States government.' In addition, had the cartel been exposed earlier, public
and diplomatic pressure probably would have inhibited or prevented its success. Section 2 of the the proposed legislation requires domestic firms to report to the Federal Trade Commission
and the Attorney General any request or command to engage in
restrictive business practices. The FTC has the expertise to vigorously enforce this provision through its administrative procedures,
without the necessity of lengthy court proceedings. In turn, the
FTC would notify the Secretary of State and the Special Trade
Representative. Failure of a corporation to report solicitation of its
participation in cartel activities would result in a civil penalty of
$1 million. The legislation also imposes an additional $25,000 penalty for each corporate officer involved in the failure to report.
Since its initial introduction in the Ninety-fifth Congress, the
idea of requiring United States firms to report anticompetitive
activity required by foreign governments has received considerable
139. Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce 8, 9 (April 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Wald letter]. Ms.
Wald's provocative letter is reproduced in full elsewhere in this volume.
140. Id. at 10. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (1976).
141. Memorandum, supra note 31.

298

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:273

favorable response. Donald Flexner of the Antitrust Division commented as follows on the usefulness of the reporting requirement:
[S]ome sort of reporting onus .

would dovetail nicely with our

increased emphasis on bilateral consultations. .

.

. A requirement

imposed on United States entities operating abroad to notify us of
such actions would serve as an early alert to the United States
government to institute the consultation process. If it came
promptly, we would have a good chance to employ diplomatic
means to prevent or to mitigate the effects of essentially private
restraints of international trade initiated or sponsored by foreign
governments. The resulting transparency would also minimize subsequent discovery and enforcement conflicts by moving of the conflict of national policies into the diplomatic realm.'
The Department of Justice's original objections to the 1978 legislation were centered on what it considered to be an overly broad
description of regulated activities.'43 The activities requiring a report under the 1979 proposal are limited to price-fixing, market or
customer allocation, restriction of production. 44 This somewhat
narrower range of targeted activities provides for governmental
notice for those anticompetitive activities most likely to adversely
affect United States commerce.
B. ProposedAmendments to the FederalTrade Commission Act
While the reporting requirements of the Cartel Restriction Act
will provide the United States with a potent tool for early detection
and prevention of the formation of future OPEC-styled cartels,
direct steps must be taken to counter government sponsored cartels. The Act provides for the amendment of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by insertion of a new section 21 which severely
restricts the use of the act of state and sovereign compulsion defenses in antitrust cases involving firms that participate in anticompetitive activities that are sponsored, "commanded," or otherwise
made effective by foreign governments."'
142. Donald Flexner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mechanisms (remarks before the 1978 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, November 15,
1978). Mr. Flexner's remarks are reproduced in full elsewhere in this volume.
143. Wald letter, supra note 139, at 3-6.
144. See H.R. 4661, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § (2)(20).
145. Id. § (2)(21).
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C.

Impact of the Act on Application
of the Act of State Doctrine

Whereas the legislation introduced in the Ninety-fifth Congress
would have flatly prohibited the use of the act of state doctrine and
the corollary sovereign compulsion defenses, the Cartel Restriction
Act allows a court to exercise its discretion in whnether to refrain
from examining the validity of the public acts of a foreign government. 46 However, the Act specifically allows judicial inquiry into
47
the motivation or circumstances behind the official act of state.
Moreover, where a foreign government requires conduct inconsistent with United States antitrust law, the Act sets broad criteria
for determining whether a firm should be held liable for engaging
in the anticompetitive behavior.'
Although the act of state and the doctrine of sovereign compulsion are distinguished by most international lawyers,'4 9 they present essentially the same policy issue. Both have served to immunize private firms, and state trading enterprises from antitrust
liability for otherwise illegal acts. The doctrines recognize or fail
to challenge foreign laws that may have harmful effects on United
States citizens. The act of state doctrine imposes a choice of law
rather than allowing a court to base its decision on proper conflict
of laws analysis.'," As is common in other countries, foreign laws
or decrees should only be recognized where they are not contrary
to the public policy of the United States. Antitrust laws are an
important expression of United States public policy which is circumvented by granting immunity from prosecution or liability to
a firm or commercial entity. Unlike expropriation cases where the
act of state doctrine has arisen in a dispute over ownership between
a foreign government and a private firm,"' the act of state has been
invoked in antitrust cases only as a defense for private firms. These
cases did not involve a challenge to the validity of the foreign act
146.

Id. § (2)(21)(b). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA§ 41 (1965).
147. H.R. 4661, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § (2)(21)(a) (1979).
148. Id.§ (2)(21)(c).
149. See PRoc. INT'L L., supra note 75 at 99, 102-03, 106; Griffin, Symposium:
American Antitrust Laws and Foreign Governments, An Introduction to the
Problem, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 137, 141, 143 (1978); GUIDE, supra note 53 at 7-8.
150. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 63, at 631-32.
151. See, e.g., Sabbatino v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See
also Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department'sAntitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215, 243-48 (1978).
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

300

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:273

of state,152 rather, the doctrine has been interpreted to allow the
coparticipation by a state in an anticompetitive commercial endeavor to bar inquiry into the activities of multinational firms.
This result is not justifiable in policy terms since the right of the
state to act is really not at issue; the object of inquiry is the role
of the private firms in schemes with foreign governments to eliminate or reduce competition. The fact that acts of states may be
used to achieve the desired result should not prevent inquiry into
whether a multinational firm is a participant in a cartel. In cases
of government-sponsored international cartels, there is no doubt
that the government-applied sanctions stimulate anticompetitive
results. There should be, however, no doubt that the contribution
of the multinational corporation is critical to the success of the
cartel.
513
The defense of sovereign compulsion requires an act of state
and is therefore subject to much of the same criticism. The sovereign compulsion doctrine permits foreign governments to require
persons subject to United States jurisdiction to engage in activity
which is harmful to United States citizens. Many corporations
may be willing to join an international cartel not only because of
the immunity from antitrust jurisdiction but because they know
that such immunity will encourage other firms to cooperate.",
International comity generally requires that a sovereign respect
the right of another to prescribe laws within its jurisdiction. 51 5 For
this reason, it has been argued that courts should not enforce
United States antitrust laws against persons who were required by
152. In American Banana plaintiff alleged that defendant had conspired with
a foreign government to have the government expropriate its competitors' holdings. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In
Occidental the defendant was charged with inducing foreign governments to assert a claim over territory of another sovereign in order to gain possession of the
plaintiff's oil concession. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal., 1971). In Hunt the defendants allegedly interfered
with plaintiff's negotiations with a foreign government which indirectly caused
that government to nationalize the plaintiff's oil concession. Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir., 1977). In all these cases the issue was not the title to
expropriated property, but rather the defendants role in bringing about the expropriation.
153. GUIDE, supra note 53, at 54. See Griffin, supra note 149, at 144.
154. Generally, firms are more likely to join a cartel when they believe other
competitors are also cooperating. If a significant number of firms, in some cases
as few as one, are likely to resist out of fear of antitrust prosecution, then the
entire cartel may be under pressure to dissolve in the classic pattern.
155. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1894).
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a foreign power to break them. This argument ignores the fact that
the antitrust laws are directed against firms and commercial entities, not sovereign states.These laws also seek to compensate injured parties.'50 Restricting the sovereign compulsion defense will
require firms to abide by domestic antitrust laws as a condition of
doing business in the United States. This position reflects the
practice of other industrialized countries which have refused to
recognize foreign laws that contravene their public policy.
Superficially, such a requirement seems unfair. The fact is, however, that multinational firms have considerable bargaining power
when dealing with host governments. United States multinational
firms bring with them capital, high technology, marketing expertise, and easy access to the United States market. Developing
countries are particularly vulnerable to this bargaining power because they are most lacking in technology and capital.' Few countries would be willing to forego access to the resources of multinational firms in order to impose a cartel arrangement because such
an arrangement would have little likelihood of success without the
cooperation of the multinational firms. Ultimately the relationship
between firm and host-country must be a symbiotic one.'58
Multinationals and host governments undergo a learning process
as the relationship matures.'59 Initially, the bargaining power is on
the side of the multinational, because it holds the capital, technology, and marketing expertise. Over time, the balance of power
shifts as both sides learn the actual constraints of the other side.
An absolute prohibition on cartel participation by firms doing
business in the United States is likely to increase the ability of
multinational firms to refuse to participate in a cartel. Host countries now depend on virtual immunity being granted to the multinational participants in a "compulsory" cartel to insure the firms'
participation. It is unlikely that multinational firms would invest
in a country without an understanding that they would not be
required to violate United States antitrust laws. As the agreement
matured, the firm could reasonably argue that continued access to
the United States market depends upon abstention from cartel
activity.
156. Note, Development of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, supra note
113, at 903-94.
157. Hymer, supra note 13, at 446-47.
158. Id. See generally BERGSTEN, supra note 2.
159. T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE,

160.

Id.

(1974).
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Political risk insurance from the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation could be expanded for firms whose assets are expropriated in retaliation for obeying United States laws.16' A country
legitimately seeking to insulate itself from destabilizing variations
in commodity prices may be amenable to a mutual commodity
agreement in lieu of cartel activity.162
Even if restricting the act of state and sovereign compulsion
defenses results in a corporation's ouster from a foreign country,
this would not necessarily be an intolerable result. In domestic law,
per se violations of the Sherman Act are still illegal no matter how
reasonable the restraints on trade may seem." 3 The Supreme Court
has held that participation in a private international cartel is illegal no matter how "reasonable" the cartel activity may be in light
of foreign trade conditions. By the same token, it seems appropriate to require firms to refrain from cartel participation even where
there may be some risk to their operations in the host-country. As
foreign trade increases in its importance to the economy, the
United States has an increasing public policy interest in insuring
that it takes place within the bounds of competition.
Under the Cartel Restriction Act, the mere presence of a sovereign act in "the factual chain" of anticompetitive conduct would
not preclude a court from examining the cause, motivation, or
circumstances related to such activity. This was the position of the
Department of Justice in its amicus brief in Hunt v. Mobil. 6' The
Department's opposition to H.R. 13922, the earlier version of the
Act introduced in 1978, was based on its concern that liability
should not be attached to acts of state that are "of a sovereign and
discretionary nature" and "within the power and jurisdiction" of
161. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation was established in order
to promote economic development and secure American access to resources and
markets abroad by insuring direct investment against political and other risks,
e.g., expropriation. See The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: A Critical
Analysis (1973) (Congressional Research Service report originally prepared by the
Library of Congress for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs).
162. See Diaz-Alejandro, Delinking North and South: Unshackled or
Unhinged? in RICH AND POOR NATIONS IN THE WORLD ECONoMY 87 (A. Goldman

ed. 1978).
163.

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also

Note, Development of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, supra note 254, at
899.
164. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 984 (1977).
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the acting state.'65 The revised Act attempts to reconcile this concern with the need for effecting the Congressionally mandated
public policy of the United States which requires that trade be free
of competitive restraints. The Act adopts an approach suggested
by Sections 40 and 41 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. 16 In the particular situation
where a foreign government requires firms engaging in commerce
affecting the United States to participate in a government organized cartel, the RESTATEMENT suggests that the effect of the sovereign act of the foreign state on the antitrust liability of the firms
depends on a balancing of the relative interests of the United
States and the foreign state." 7 While the Act does not adopt specifically the criteria set out in Section 40, it does adhere to the notion
of a balancing test involving the relative interests. Given the history and importance of the antitrust policy of the United States,
it is only natural that a weighty presumption should be given to
the public policy interests of the United States. On the other hand
the Act preserves the notion that a foreign government may have
such a strong public interest in a particular act that its anticompetitive effects on the United States should be given less weight.
While specific language better defining the balancing test to be
applied by the court must yet be devised, it is still of paramount
importance that the United States be allowed to enforce its competition policy where it strongly affects United States commerce. A
court must be permitted to seek a factual understanding of the
nature and genesis of activities in question in order to determine
whether an antitrust charge will stand-not necessarily against the
foreign government, but against those persons or firms who actively engage in cartels. In situations where the cartel would not
have been effective but for the activities of the firms involved,
those firms should still bear antitrust liability for their acts, even
though there is a sovereign act involved.
V.

CONCLUSION

The post-war era has seen a tremendous growth in the trade of
raw materials and manufactured goods. More capital for direct
investment has flowed across national boundaries. Direct invest165.

Wald letter, supra note 297, at 7.

166.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

STATES

167.

§§ 40, 41 (1965).

Id.

§ 41,

illustration 13.

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
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ment abroad hag occurred in raw materials and manufacturing
industries mainly as a result of oligopoly pressures. The oligopoly
characteristics-high concentration ratios, high barriers to entry,
and the threat of declining market position-which have pushed
these industries past their national borders, induce them into overt
or tacit cartel activity. When that activity is removed from antitrust jurisdiction by the acts, "commands," or active cooperation
of a foreign sovereign, the resulting cartels may also be immune
from most of the pressures which generally cause cartels to fall
apart.
United States antitrust laws have been effective against the majority of the worst anticompetitive domestic activities, especially
cartels. The "direct and substantial effects" test allows United
States courts to exert jurisdiction over anticompetitive activities
abroad which adversely affect the welfare of United States consumers. The most glaring exceptions, however, to the rule of law
are presented by the doctrines of act of state and sovereign compulsion. These exceptions immunize from antitrust liability multinational corporations that participate in foreign governmentsponsored cartels. These sorts of government-sponsored arrangements, however, are most dangerous to the welfare of consumers.
Such cartels impose a regressive sort of excise tax through artificial
restraints, burdening those who can least afford it. They also cause
massive misallocation of scarce resources.
United States antitrust policy must be revised to prevent anticompetitive activity undertaken by businesses with the cooperation of foreign governments. The United States must reach an
agreement with its trading partners regarding restrictive business
practices. In return for such an agreement, the United States
should respond to the needs of countries which suffer from fluctuations in commodity prices. Mutual commodity agreements, technological aid, and even increased levels of loans and assistance
present options significantly preferable to cartels. Should such
multilateral efforts fail, however, the United States should be prepared to use its full economic power in order to negate anticompetitive behavior by multinational firms and foreign governments.
The United States should limit the act of state and sovereign
compulsion doctrine as they apply to violations of the antitrust
laws. The courts should apply a standard conflict of laws test with
a special regard to the importance of antitrust law to United States
commerce and trade. Large multinational corporations should no
longer escape examination simply because they are able to induce
or persuade foreign governments into taking anticompetitive ac-
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tions. While the right to lobby foreign governments may be protected, the exercise of such right should be subject to rigorous
scrutiny.
It is time for the United States to implement an effective anticartel policy. The United States has allowed foreign governments
to tamper directly with its economic well-being. The inflationary
pressures which threaten our social equity programs are due in part
to the effects of cartel action by foreign governments. Any solution
must respect the principles of comity and must harmonize our
policy with that of our trading partners. This does not preclude the
United States from taking firm action against cartels. The Cartel
Restriction Act pending in the 96th Congress will be the nucleus
of an anti-cartel policy which will safeguard the welfare of all consumers in the United States dnd other countries as well.

APPENDIX I*
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
That this Act may be cited as the "Cartel Restriction Act of 1979".
SEC. 2. The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et
seq.) is amended by redesignating section 20 and section 21 as
section 22 and section 23, respectively, and by inserting after section
19 the following new sections:
"SEC. 20. (a) (1) In any case in which any United States person, partnership, or corporation, or any foreign subsidiary of a
United States person, partnership, or corporation"(A) engages, in concert with any foreign concern which
competes with such person, partnership, or corporation, in any
activity which relates to (or which may be construed to relate

to)

"(i)
"(ii)

the establishment of prices;
the allocation of markets or customers;

or
"(iii) the limitation or other restriction of the production, distribution, or availability of any product or service
made or otherwise provided by such person, partnership,
or corporation; or
"(B) is required or requested by a foreign state to engage,
in concert with any foreign concern which competes with such
person, partnership, or corporation, in any activity specified in
subparagraph (A);
such United States person, partnership, or corporation shall submit
notice of any such activity, requirement, or request to the Commission and to the Attorney General not later than 20 days after
the commencement of such activity, or the date on which such
requirement is imposed or such request is made, as the case may be.
"(2) In any case in which any United States person, partnership, or corporation"(A) is engaged in a joint venture with any foreign concern (other than a foreign subsidiary of such United States
*This bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Gore to
amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to require persons subject to the
Act to submit reports regarding certain business activities conducted by such
persons in foreign states in order to enable the Federal Trade Commission to
determine whether such activities may involve anticompetitive practices, and
for other purposes.
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person, partnership, or corporation) with respect to the sale or
other offering of any product or service;
"(B) such person, partnership, or corporation has knowledge that such foreign concern is engaging, in concert with any
of its competitors, in any activity specified in paragraph
(1) (A) relating to such product or service;
such United States person, partnership, or corporation shall submit
notice of any such activity to the Commission and to the Attorney
General not later than 20 days after acquiring knowledge of such
activity.
"(b) The Commission shall submit timely notice to the Secretary
of State, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission of any activity which is the
subject of a notice received by the Commission under subsection

(a).
"(c) (1) Any United States person, partnership, or corporation
which fails to submit any notice required in subsection (a) shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000 for each
violation, and not more than $20,000 for each day during which
such violation occurs.
"(2) (A) In any case in which a United States person, partnership, or corporation fails to make timely notice under subsection
(a), any officer or director of such United States person, partnership, or corporation who knowingly so fails shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not more than $25,000.
"(B) In any case in which a fine is imposed under subparagraph
(A) upon any officer or director of a United States person, partnership, or corporation, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such United States person, partnership, or corporation.
"(3) Any penalty imposed under this section shall be subject to
section 162(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
fines and penalties).
"(d) (1) The Commission shall by rule require that the notice
required in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
shall be in such form, and shall contain such documentary material
and information relating to the activity, requirement, or request
involved, as is necessary and appropriate to enable the Commission
to determine whether such activity violates this Act or the antitrust
Acts, or whether such requirement or request would result in any
activity which violates this Act or the antitrust Acts.
"(2) The Commission may by rule exempt from the requirements of this section any class of persons, conduct, or agreements
which is not likely to violate this Act or the antitrust Acts.
"(e) The Commission may exercise its authority under section
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5, with respect to unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in order to enforce the provisions of this
section, except that only the penalties set forth in subsection (c)
shall apply with respect to violations of this section.
"(f) As used in this section:
"(1) The term 'concern' means an individual or a corporation, partnership, association, or other entity.
"(2) The term 'foreign concern' means"(A) an individual who is not a citizen, national, or
resident of the United States; and
"(B) a concern (other than an individual) which is
organized or exists under the laws of a foreign state.
"(3) (A) The term 'foreign state' includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.
"(B) The term 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state' means any entity which"(i) is a separate legal person;
"(ii) is an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision of a foreign state, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
a political subdivision of a foreign state; and
"(iii) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States, nor created under the laws of any third country.
"(4) The term 'foreign subsidiary' means a foreign concern
which is controlled by or under common control with, or which
controls, a United States person, partnership, or corporation,
as determined under rules promulgated by the Commission.
"(5) The term 'joint venture' means an association of 2 or
more concerns to carry out a business enterprise for profit,
for which purpose such concerns combine property, money,
expertise, or other assets.
"(6) The term 'United States person, partnership, or corporation' means"(A) an individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
"(B) a person (other than an individual), partnership,
or corporation which has its principal place of business in
the United States or which is organized under the laws
of a State, of the United States, or of a territory or possession of the United States.
"SEC. 21. (a) In any action brought to enforce the provisions
of this Act or the antitrust Acts, the court in which such action is
brought shall not have any authority to decline to exercise juris-

310

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12.273

diction over such action solely on the ground that the complaint
involved in such action would require an examination of the reasons
or motivations for, and circumstances relating to, any official
action of a foreign state. The Federal act of state doctrine and the
foreign compulsion doctrine shall not be construed in a manner
which restricts or otherwise limits the authority of the court to
carry out such an examination.
"(b) In any action specified in subsection (a), the court may
refrain from examining the validity or legality of any official
action of a foreign state within its territory by which such foreign
state has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public
interest.
"(c) In any case in which a foreign state enacts, adopts, or
otherwise establishes any law or policy requiring or prohibiting
any action by a United States person, partnership, or corporation
(or any foreign subsidiary of such person, partnership, or corporation) which is inconsistent with any requirement or prohibition in
this Act or in the antitrust Acts, and an action is brought against
such United States person, partnership, or corporation, or against
such foreign subsidiary, to enforce the provisions of this Act or
of the antitrust Acts, the court in which such action is brought, in
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over such action, shall
take into account"(1) the extent to which the vital national interests of the
United States or of the foreign state are involved in such
action; and
"(2) the extent to which the enforcement of such law or
policy by the foreign state with respect to such United States
person, partnership, or corporation, or such foreign subsidiary,
will have any direct and foreseeable effect upon the commercial interests of the United States.
"(d) For purposes of this section, the terms 'foreign state',
'foreign subsidiary', and 'United States person, partnership, or
corporation' have the meanings given them in section 20 (f).".

APPENDIX 11*
A BILL
To amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to impose certain
reporting requirements on United States persons with respect to
restrictive business practices abroad, to direct the President to
seek an agreement with other countries to prohibit restrictive business practices, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.)
is amended by redesignating sections 20 and 21 as sections 21
and 22, respectively, and by inserting after section 19 the following
new section:
"Sec. 20. (a)(1) In any case in which"(A) any United States person, partnership, or corporation,
or any foreign susidiary of a United States person, partnership, or corporation"(i) engages in restrictive business practices on account of any requirement of the government of a foreign
country, or
"(ii) is requested directly or indirectly by the government of a foreign country to engage in restrictive business practices; or
"(B) any United States person, partnership, or corporation
is engaged in a joint venture with a foreign concern (other
than a foreign subsidiary of such United States person, partnership, or corporation) that engages in restrictive business
practices,
such United States person, partnership, or corporation shall report
such restrictive business practices, or request to engage in such
practices, to the Commission.
"(2) The Commission shall notify the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations of activities reported to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1).
"(b)(1) Any United States person, partnership, or corporation
that fails to make a report required by subsection (a)(1) of this
* This bill (H.R. 13922) was presented by Mr. Gore in the House of Representatives on August 17, 1978.
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section shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than
$1,000,000.
"(2) In any case in which a United States person, partnership,
or corporation fails to make a report required by subsection (a)(1)
of this section, any officer or director of such United States concern
who knowingly failed to make such report shall be subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000.
"(3) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) of this
subsection upon any officer or director of a United States person,
partnership, or corporation, such fine shall not be paid, directly or
indirectly, by such United States person, partnership, or corporation.
"(c) The Commission may exercise its authority under section 5
of this Act, with respect to unfair methods of competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, in order to enforce the provisions of
this section, except that only the penalties set forth in subsection
(b) of this section shall apply with respect to violations of this
section.
"(d) As used in this section"(1) the term 'restrictive business practices' means"(A) fixing prices, terms, or conditions to be observed
in dealing with others in the purchase, sale, or lease of
any product;
"(B) excluding enterprises from or allocating or dividing any territorial market or field of business activity,
allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase
quotas;
"(C) discriminating against particular enterprises;
and
"(D) limiting production or fixing production quotas.
"(2) the term 'concern' means an individual or a corporation, partnership, association, or other entity;
"(3) the term 'United States person, partnership, or
corporation' means (A) an individual who is a citizen,
national, or resident of the United States, and (B) a person (other than an individual), partnership, or corporation that has its principal place of business in the United
States or that is organized under the laws of a State of
the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States;
"(4) the term 'foreign concern' means (A) an individual who is not a citizen, national, or resident of the
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United States, and (B) a concern (other than an individual) that is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign
country;
"(5) the term 'foreign subsidiary' means a foreign concern that is in fact controlled by a United States person,
partnership, or corporation, as determined under regulations issued by the Commission; and
"(6) the term 'joint venture' means an association of
two or more concerns to carry out a business enterprise
for profit, for which purpose such concerns combine
property, money, expertise, or other assets."
Sec. 2. The President shall, as soon as practicable after the date
of the enactment of this Act, take the steps necessary to convene
a conference of the signatory countries of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade for the purpose of amending that agreement
and any other appropriate international agreement, or entering
into a new agreement, to prohibit restrictive business practices, as
defined in section 301(f) of the Trade Act of 1974, as added by
section 3(b) of this Act. It is the sense of the Congress that any such
amendment or agreement should impose an obligation on each
signatory country of the agreement being amended or of a new
agreement, as the case may be, to enact and enforce legislation to
prohibit all persons subject to its jurisdiction from engaging in
restrictive business practices.
Sec. 3. (a) Section 301(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
2411(a)) is amended(1) in paragraph (3) by striking out "or" at the end thereof;
(2) in paragraph (4) by adding "or" at the end thereof;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph:
"(5) engages in restrictive business practices which affect or
may affect United States commerce or requires directly or
indirectly United States concerns to engage in restrictive
business practices."
(b) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(f) For purposes of subsection (a)(5), the term 'restrictive business practices' means any of the following:
"(1) Fixing prices, terms, or conditions to be observed in
dealing with others in the purchase, sale, or lease of any product.
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"(2) Excluding enterprises from or allocating or dividing
any territorial market or field of business activity, allocating
customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase quotas.
"(3) Discriminating against particular enterprises.
"(4) Limiting production or fixing production quotas."
Sec. 4. (a) No court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the Federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits in any case involving the provisions of this Actor of
any of the antitrust acts.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "antitrust acts" means
"antitrust acts" as defined in section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and includes that Act and any other law regulating the
restraint of trade or commerce.

